

P
HÖRD

- D 17668
- D 17697
- E 17711
- EH 6696
- HB 10658 HB 17730
- HB 11303 HB 17736
- HB 12999 HB 17739
- HB 16363 HB 17740
- HB 17666 HB 17742
- HB 17669 HB 17745
- HB 17676 HB 17752
- HB 17680 HB 17771
- HB 17684 HB 17774
- HB 17713 HB 17776
- HB 17714 HB 17741
- HB 17715 HB 17830
- HB 17716 HB 17833
- HB 17720 HB 16609
- HB 17727 HB 17834
- I 9273 Z 8624 Z 17767

This is the record of the interrogation of businessman CRAIG Michael Williamson, date of birth 23 April 1949, residing at 4A Orange Road, Orchards, Gauteng, Johannesburg. Date of birth 23 April 1949. The interrogation is being held on Friday 18 October 1996 commencing at 12.15. The place where the interrogation is being held is the premises of the Angolan security police in Luanda, Angola. The chief interrogator is Detective Superintendent Hans Ölvbro and Chief Prosecutor Jan Danielsson is also present. Another three persons are also present, these being a South African security policeman and two members of the Angolan security police. Their names are not being committed to the record but are being noted off the record.

Williamson has been informed that he is to be interrogated concerning the allegations that he is involved in the murder of Olof Palme.

- Ö = Ölvbro
- D = Danielsson
- W = Williamson
- U = Unidentified voice (SA security)

Ö: Yes, Mr Williamson, can you start with a brief information of your background?

W: A brief one would be difficult.

Ö: Well, make it as brief as you want.

W: I was born in Johannesburg in 1949. I went to school in Johannesburg: first to Saint Stythian's College, after which I went to Saint John's College. I matriculated in 1967. I joined the South African Police on the sixth of May 1968. [REDACTED] I became a student constable. I

did routine student police work until 1969, at which time I attended the police training college in Pretoria and graduated at the end of 1969 as a fully-qualified police constable. I was posted to a uniformed branch in Johannesburg in a suburb called Park View in 19...during 1970. I did normal beat, normal uniformed police work, but I also wrote the sergeant's exams, and in 1970 I think, late 70, I passed to sergeant and was promoted. I was then posted from Park View to Ranburg, to a plain-clothes unit specialising in housebreaking, called "the special housebreaking unit". The reason I was transferred was because in those days it was very unusual for a 21-year-old to be a sergeant and when you had 40-year-old constables with 20-years' experience, they wouldn't listen to a 21-year-old sergeant with one year, two years' experience. While I was with the housebreaking unit I was approached by members of the security police who had heard somehow that I wanted to go to university, because the reason I joined the police in the first place was to do several years full-time service rather than the national service in the military, which meant you had to do one year and then every year for the next ten or fifteen years you had to do. So I decided to get my service over, get some experience, go to university and study law. When I was approached by these gentlemen, they told me there was a way to go to university to study but to stay in the police and to have my studies paid and to join the security police, which sounded very exciting. So I did, and in 1972 or late in '71 I resigned from the South African police and then went under the wing of the security police and in '72 I became a student at the university of Witwatersrand.

[REDACTED]

In that year there was some confrontation between the police and students in South Africa [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I got to know my fellow people who had been charged: quite a large number of students had been arrested. Then I became involved in the arts faculty council and the NUSAS: National Union of South African Students, the local committees, and by 1973 I was already on the local committees of the arts faculty council and... I think let's just all open them all at once at once then with one noise. So, as I was saying, in 1973 I became involved on committee level with NUSAS and the arts faculty council and I went to the NUSAS national congress, which is... Can I use NUSAS now? National Union of South African Students. And I started becoming quite involved. By the end of 1973


I was already on the students' representative council and in 1973 or...yeah 1974 I was elected as a full-time office bearer on the national executive of NUSAS. That meant I had to leave university and go to Capetown and work full-time, because that's how it was done at that time. So in 1974 and in 1975 I was working full-time with NUSAS: 1975 congress I was elected vice-president of NUSAS. That is the first time, in 1975, that I went overseas officially as part of student delegations, met with the International University Exchange Fund, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson and the whole connection began. [REDACTED]

Pomn
HOB 16609
H816363
H517684
3 Pomn

[REDACTED] So I continued with my job in NUSAS and during 1976, as you know, there were some uprisings in South Africa. Times were very politically bad and as a result of many things, also a lot of white students on the campuses started feeling that NUSAS was too radical. NUSAS was supporting the black liberation struggle, was supporting...calling for Nelson Mandela's release and anyway, during 1976 the executive of NUSAS was in fact dismissed. There were some more conservative students... I would say liberal, but in that context conservative, because what we were, what some of us were pretending to be was very left-wing. So towards the...at the end of '76 basically I was out of NUSAS, but I'd made very good connections with the ANC abroad and I'd also made good connections with other international organisations [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I left South Africa right at the end of 1976 and in the first weeks of 1977 I was in Gaborone. I applied for refugee status, I got my United Nations travel documents, I went via Lusaka where I just checked in with the ANC, I spoke with [REDACTED] and I went to Geneva and I saw [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] organised me a job with IUEF, which was the information officer: to publicise information against apartheid. At that time these funds would be coming from monies donated to IUEF for anti-apartheid work in South Africa, and the idea was that I would co-ordinate in some way the programmes being supported by IUEF in southern Africa. Before that I had to organise work permits and all that, so I did. And early in '77 I was working full time for IUEF in Geneva. In 1977 I took a reasonably low profile with anti-apartheid movements because of the sensitivity of the fact that I was white South African, and some, especially the black consciousness groups, weren't too happy with a white South African coming in to IUEF, and also from the ANC there was some concern about who I was. [REDACTED]

2 Pomn



There was worry in South Africa at that time about the development of the black consciousness movement from 1976 and so that was '78. '79 things continued: I was the deputy director I was doing a lot of work, running all over the world, going to anti-apartheid conferences speaking at the UN against South Africa, generally running the International University Exchange Fund together with Eriksson. There was, late in 1979, there was this small problem with the Swedes, which you would probably know about, where somebody in the Swedish legation in Lusaka asked the ANC if they knew that I'd been a policeman previously in South Africa and was I not perhaps still linked with the authorities. That was cleared up, I got a letter from the ANC saying there had never been any reason to suspect me and that they were happy to work with me,




The first Sunday's article that came out shocked me, because it had McGivern's photograph and I'd been on the SRC of Witwatersrand University with

Pom

Pom

McGivern, and I suddenly realised that if he'd been a desk officer in intelligence during all those years, he probably knew exactly who I was, which turned out to be the case. But I waited until the next week's article. The next article came out, specifically named IUEF as being a prime target of South African intelligence, at which stage I realised I was in some trouble.



7
1022
● 8616609
HB 17684
HBD 17830
4/20/29

7022

7022

[REDACTED]

7000

I then phoned South Africa, and it was that next day, when I got to London, that there was another article in the newspaper, I think in The Guardian, saying that the IUEF had discovered a spy, but not saying my name. I then phoned South Africa, and it was written by Hugh Lewin, and Hugh Lewin, the journalist, is a big friend of Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, so I knew, obviously, that the game was up. I phoned South Africa, they said...they told me: "Your name's already in the paper in South Africa. They haven't published it in England, but they haven't worried..." because I think in England the first editions had a legal problem: they didn't want to say something that they might be sued for. But then the next editions came out with my name in them.

[REDACTED]

I got a house. My wife sorted out a university because she had been studying in Geneva and I was then appointed as...to develop a new co-ordinating section in the security police: an intelligence section. The idea of the section was basically to coordinate the deep penetration, deep cover operations such as the one that I'd been involved in.

[REDACTED]

That's what I did from '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 and '85. And I was by that time a major. When I came back to South Africa I was a captain and '80...end of '81 I was promoted to major.

[REDACTED]

Pom-

HB017830

[REDACTED]

I also was involved in...I got deeply involved in the normal bureaucracy of intelligence work and the government departments, the State Security Council and the sub-committees and the evaluations and daily reports and, you know, all that stuff. And I became quite involved in the Mozambique situation from 1985 after the accord '84 '85, because I sat on the joint-security commission between Mozambique and South Africa and I liaised with the Mozambiquean intelligence.

In 1983 I started getting...let me put it this way: in the years I'd been underground I thought...I had an image of South African intelligence and of government strategy which was different to what I found when I came out. Instead of them being very clever and carrying out very clever strategies I found we were basically doing crisis management. So '80 '81 '82 I was learning the system and I wasn't...my transition from being an operator on my own, involved in...at the highest level in political negotiations and political work relating to South Africa and its position internationally, I'd suddenly had to become a bureaucrat, and it was difficult. I had to work with budgets and...but also I wasn't too impressed with the thinking process that was going on. So I started writing an article, which I published, I think in June July '84 in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, which nearly got me fired because...the only reason it didn't get me fired is because I'd been intelligent enough to get permission to publish it, but the minister of law and order, Louis le Grange was very angry with what I said, because basically what I said was that in a democratic society, and I said "we're in a new South Africa, we have a new constitution, a new tripartite system where we have coloureds Indians and whites for the first time now voting." The blacks still didn't have the vote, but there was some movement. I said "now, as part of this new approach to politics in South Africa, we also have to have some new thinking in the security system. And I wrote absolutely straight that the use of military force against a country's own population by its government means the end of democracy. General Coetzee laughed.

Pom-

HB10658

HB017830

[REDACTED]

Secondly, the state of emergency I completely disagreed

with. I said "if we militarise the South African situation, we're going to have a war. If we don't find a political solution, we have got problems." That was basically what my position was. And I said: "the more we militarise, the more...that's what the ANC want us to do. The more we clamp down, the more international support they'll get, the more the people will be oppressed, the more they'll react and be pro-ANC. That's just a vicious circle." And then the Gaborone raid completely finished me. I mean, I was used to go to Parliament and to go on TV and justify something that was a complete abortion and didn't do what should have been done. As my attitude at that time was: if we knew there were some ANC operators in a house in Gaborone, we could send five, ten guys at night and go and take out that house. To just put a huge military force into Gaborone and just kill a whole load of people and smash up everything was a political action aimed at Botswana, nothing to do with the ANC. And it fitted with my whole...I said: "right, we're heading for a...if we continue this way, well, we're going to go...it's going to be a full-scale war." So 1985 I resigned and the end, 31st of December '85, that was the end.

And during that time I'd been thinking and planning what I was going to do. I decided I wanted to go into politics. I'd talked to some people. Everybody told me that from '87, '88 there would be an election and if I played my cards right I could get nomination as a National Party candidate.

D: How do you spell that?

W:

. And then they had another section called Ander Lande: other countries. This was everything north of Zaire and then the rest of the world. And I agreed that I would...there were some two or three people from my section in the police who also weren't happy and I said: "I'll help you

Pom
HBC17741
M.F.L


Pom
HBD17830
HBG16609

establish some operations for Ander Lande: other countries." And so I became what was now what is called a Lieutenant-Colonel, SO1: Staff Officer One in charge of Ander Lande at that time.

D: When was that?

W: That was...well second of January 1986. January '86, the beginning of January of course nothing much happened, and the first time...well we then were discussing and setting up the operations and that's why...I mean January and February that's all we were doing, was doing budgets and getting people, the other guys from the police to come and join. And I have organised in South Africa a team of people to investigate that period of time so that I can get specific information on what...if I can find out where I was exactly during the period of time: what I was doing, credit card receipts or contracts I signed, whatever, so that we can establish. But I didn't... To my best knowledge I certainly didn't leave South Africa until probably April; March or April 1986, when... During 1985 we had prevented a coup in the Seychelles,

Pom



Pom
H.810658

Pom

Pom

Norm




Ö: Mr Williamson, we have to make a short break. We have to turn the tape. Turn it over.

Ö: We have had a five minutes' break and I will ask Mr Williamson to go on from when he was interrupted.

W: Sorry, where were we exactly?

U: You were talking about the coup and the...or the jail and whatever was taken out of office.

W:



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] But I had been told that an election was now definitely coming and I worked towards the end of '86 on my relations with the National Party and early in 1987 I resigned from military intelligence and became a proper, genuine one hundred per cent civilian working for the GMR group and I also received the nomination from the National Party to stand for parliament in 1987 in Bryanston, which is in the northern part of Johannesburg. I spearheaded, in 1987, the election campaign for the National Party on security. I think everybody knows that National Party campaign was run basically...it was an anti-ANC campaign. The vote, everything was related to the ANC and...

Q: Please go on...

W: ...and the...the problem was that we had identified, in doing some surveys of white voters, that even those white voters who didn't like the National Party and who were pro the Progressive Federal Party, which later became the Democratic Party, but then was the PFP; even voters who were pro-PFP, didn't trust the PFP when it came to its policy on security and the ANC, so we homed in on that and the National Party won a very very big victory in 1987. I got my reward for my job and I was appointed to the President's Council. Now the President's Council at that stage was the upper house of parliament. It was a council which basically was a deadlock-breaking body. We had three houses...three chambers in the parliament: the white chamber, house of assembly; coloured chamber, house of representatives; Indian chamber, house of delegates. And all legislation had to go through all three chambers and had to be approved, so when there was controversial legislation, particularly relating to security or Group Areas Acts, apartheid legislation, often there was a problem, where the legislation didn't go through. Then it was referred to the President's Council and it was debated. The President's Council could then do several things: it could pass the legislation or it could throw it out or it could refer it back for some modifications, but the President's Council at that stage was a very unpopular body, because it was the President's...it was the President's men, and they...it was the body that meant that he could rule the country, because any legislation that parliament didn't pass, he could have his council pass, and because we had a majority, the National Party and the President's Council: thirty, thirty-five National Party members of the President's Council, had the

power to do whatever the President wanted them to do, so in terms of apartheid legislation it was not a popular organisation...body. I worked there until the end of 1990-1991. And I was a member of the President's Council and a businessman. I spent some of my time also doing some political work: I was on the National Party defence committee; I was very close with General Malan, and on...specifically on the Mozambique issue. And then later on Angola. I had certain political contacts that...that I...I was used to carry out, which...because I was, well I suppose capable of doing it, but also it was often useful to have somebody that was less official: he was a President's Councillor, but it wasn't as official as having, say, an official from the government or something doing it, so I could go and talk to people, take messages, bring messages back. And I enjoyed doing that. I enjoyed politics. In...sorry, during this time we had another election because President Botha had a stroke, and you know he was moved out and then, just very briefly, just for interest's sake, just to tell you that basically what was happening in South Africa was that up until President Botha's stroke, the securocrats - the security establishment - were running South Africa. I was working, I was a securocrat, there's no way I can get away from that, that's what I was, it's...I've been for all the years. But I was one of the securocrats who believed that we were...our job was to give the politicians time to solve the political problem, not to solve the political problem with military force: that was my difference with some of my colleagues. But in 1989, also in 1989 I was the only National Party politician, I'll put my head on a block, who wrote in an official election pamphlet: 'Vote for me...' because I then stood in Niger, the very famous, where John Vorster, the ex-president/prime minister, a very famous constituency. And I stood against the Conservative Party. In the '87 election I'd stood against the left, the left Liberal Party. In this election I stood against the Conservatives. And I was the only politician in that election who wrote in an official publication and said: 'Vote for me, vote for the National Party because you can trust us to negotiate with the ANC on your behalf.' Well, I mean, the National Party nearly had a heart attack. Said "What am I saying? Talking about negotiating with the ANC before an election?" I said "but we are negotiating with the ANC. " "Yes, but you mustn't tell the voters that." So, anyway, I did. So I...I was then re-appointed to the President's Council, because obviously I didn't win Niger in a conservative area. Saying we're going to negotiate with the ANC didn't go down too well. But I was one of two National Party candidates in that entire election that increased the percentage of the National Party vote. The National Party did very badly in the '89 election. But in my constituency we increased our percentage of the vote, so I said "well..." Anyway, I was re-

appointed to the President's Council and we went through the change from the securocrats to what I would call the Broederbonders. The political force behind the National Party came back into power, because Botha had kept them at bay and the people in the National Party who had believed that they could deal with the ANC as a political force then took power, and the securocrats were pushed aside. I didn't lose my job, but I lost my influence and I just became just another guy. And during that year, we had caucus meetings and meetings and I was asked: "What do you think about the new policy?" And I said "well, if you understand what you've done, I think it's great. But I don't think you understand what you've done. Because" I said "if you think the National Party can compete with the ANC politically, then you had better start thinking again." And my...the day I decided to resign was after a caucus meeting at which the chief, the head of the Broederbond, Gerrit Viljoen, made a big speech to us, we did a three-day seminar, and we were told: "the strategy of the National Party will be now to defeat the ANC in an election, based on a Christian alliance, because eighty per cent of the people of South Africa are Christian, we'll forge a Christian alliance and we'll win an election." So I said: "Thank you, gentlemen. Dream on, but I'm not dreaming with you. I'm going to go and make a life for myself." And the first of January 1991, I sent them a fax, I said: "I'm resigning. Thank you very much. Good bye." And 1991, 1992 I started doing business. I tried, obviously through where I'm best, have best been involved. First of all, Mozambique. I became involved in some...in a lobster project and some prawn fishing. I then also extended the prawn activity from Mozambique to Tanzania, so I thought we could fish in the northern areas of Mozambique, in the southern waters of Tanzania, prawns and sell them in South Africa. The biggest reason that didn't work was because I was involved in another business here in Angola, which had just started. But when the war broke out here again there were some problems with payments: the money I had been getting from the company operating here dried up, which meant I was in a cash-flow problem: I'd been using that money to subsidise developing my fishing business and I had problems. So from...1993 was a bad year. I was just trying to develop business and then basically since then, since the...the development of the...of the improvement of the peace situation in Angola, I've been involved in a company that is working in Angola and we do three things: we trade - we send South African goods from South Africa to Angola, Peter Stuyvesant one of them, Rothmans, Dunhill, Coca-Cola, potatoes, onions, some...a few other...cosmetics, I mean consumer goods. We have a mining, I would say a mining contracting division which is busy, is preparing to provide mining

services to Angolan companies that have mining concessions; in other words we don't want the concession, we want when an Angolan company has the concession we will provide the mining services and equipment. And then the third thing is, well on the first one, on the trading also I've...because previously I've been involved in aviation I'm still involved in the aviation side, but that's mainly bringing goods from Angola...from South Africa to Angola. But now I want to expand, I want to start using cargo aircraft from Angola into other parts of Africa. But sorry then the third thing I do is...the company I am associated with represents Iscor Balaton. It's Iscor, the steel and iron and steel company and it has a...I don't want to call it 'cheap'. It has a cost-effective design for Africa: a housing system which does houses, warehouses, clinics, schools, hospitals. And that is...my biggest contract that we are busy working on now is a 500-house contract here. I had some problems with my Angolan friends now, related I think to my immigration status, which developed because of all this nonsense in the newspapers and that brings us up to today.

Ö: Okay. Then we have some questions I think. You start or...? Have you been in Sweden? And if you have, when?

W:

[REDACTED]

Ö: Where in Sweden did you stay?

W: In Stockholm.

Ö: In Stockholm. The only place?

W: Yes. And it's a hotel I can't remember the name. Somewhere close to SIDA. They organised it each time. Close by.

Ö: What kind of people have you met in Sweden?

W:

Political people.

[REDACTED]

LP
4/11
FL
V8060 H.F.L

Ö: It can be correct, yes.

H. Pomm
#712899

W:

[REDACTED]

Pomm
HBB

there [REDACTED]

Ö: I have to ask you another question about persons in Sweden: Have you ever met a policeman? I don't mean if you have asked a policeman in the street what the street is. I don't mean that contact. Have you met and...you get...and you knew any policemen in Sweden?

W: I'm not...that I believe, I mean. Intelligence, secret policemen or proper policemen?

Ö: Anyone.

W: Well, on the intelligence side I mean I can't really comment, but no, it doesn't ring a bell. I mean, not that I'm become friendly with, certainly not.

Ö: You must be aware of this international police association. Have you any contacts in Sweden such...?

W: No.

Ö: Did you meet Mr Palme?

W: No, I don't think I ever met him.

Ö: 1990 I think it was an interview with you in a newspaper down here. It's called 'Rapport'. And you said in this interview that you had talked to a minister, a Swedish minister about the murder case of Olof Palme and there was a South African link. I have the paper, but it's in Swedish, so you can't read it. This newspaper was...it's a sensational newspaper...in South Africa

and it's Sunday in the middle of March I think. I don't have the exact date for this. And you have made statements saying the politician and businessman Craig Williamson, that he has friends in Sweden and there it also says that you can be involved in this murder.

W: That was after the article in the Swedish newspaper.

Ö: Yes, maybe, yes, but I'm interested in which minister you talked to.

W: I don't think I spoke to any minister.

Ö: Yet they say you have 1987.

W: If it's in the newspaper it must be true.

Ö: Yes. I have to ask.

W: No, I know. No look I don't...I vaguely remember that article and I think it irritated me a lot, because there was some foolish journalist who phoned me. The only newspaper in South Africa that followed up the story in the Swedish newspaper was Rapport and then I remember they wrote complete nonsense, you know. You know I certainly never spoke to any minister in Sweden about the murder of Olof Palme.

Ö: Okay.

W:

Ö: Well I'm interested in if you can describe the level in...when you were in the security police. Who is the man who is taken the decision to make anything against, for instance Swedish prime minister.

W: Jesus! Look...first of all I can't believe anybody would make the decision. If the decision were made it would have to be at the very very very top. And I mean, I mean the president. I...and then...it's...to me it would be beyond belief. Sorry, can I make one point too that I didn't make before? It's a matter of record, and you can check: the company Longreach and the name Longreach came from a...we bought a company in Jersey in the UK from a lawyer or a company accountant type, the people who form companies. And

he presented us a document with a list of companies available, and when I read it I said: "ah, Longreach!" I'd never...before I read that document I'd never heard the word 'Longreach'. So, I mean and that, you know that was definitely in April. This Operation Longreach story...I mean, you know and do you know where to go to check that?

D: Now we speak of April '86.

Ö: Yes. I read something somewhere in our papers that there is a 'the need to know chain.' What's that?

W: The...?


Ö: 'The need to know chain.'

W: Chain yes.

Ö: What's that?

W: Need to know is the principle that intelligence organisations usually use in their operations, which is that anybody involved in the operation only needs...must only know what he needs to know to do his job. So if, to give you an example, if...take this meeting: if I need to be brought to this meeting to meet you and this is...the guy who fetches me doesn't need to know that I'm coming here to meet Swedish people. He just needs to know that I must come here at this time. That's 'need to know.' So each person in an operation is only told what he requires to carry out his particular function.

Ö: Okay. Mr Prosecutor...

D: Thank you. I will go back a little. 

W: I think it was once. Basically the visit...if, even if I went so many times, it was...my visits to Sweden were always related to IUEF and to reporting basically to SIDA and to the foreign office on the projects that were being carried out. So it was usually very specific and in '75...if we were at home I have even a copy of my report that I wrote on my '75 trip. I could give you more detail. And I will even make a copy if you wish. But every time it

Down

was...because in '75 we split up: the guy I went with on the trip Mark Stint the NUS president-elect and I were sent to different places, but I've got a feeling that I went to Sweden.

D: Did you go there on your own initiative or were you invited or sent there by the organisation?

W: IUEF.

D: Yes.

W: Each time.

D: When you visited Sweden, have you ever had any other identity than your Craig Williamson?

W: No.

D: You have never travelled with any other passport, any other identity?

W: Never been to Sweden except, I believe, on my South African passport once, in '75, and after that on my UN document.

D: Have you ever had a passport in another name than Williamson?

W: [REDACTED]

D: [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

D: [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

D: [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

D: Mr Ölvebro asked you before if you had associated with Swedish policemen while in Sweden and you said that you hadn't done that as far as you know. Have you met with a Swedish policeman in South Africa or elsewhere?

W: Once there was...I thought maybe they were Danish policemen, but I...there were some policemen from Scandinavia once that came to South Africa in the early eighties.

D: Do you remember his name?

W: No, it was a group.

D: A group?

W: A group, yes.

D: What was their purpose for visiting?

W: It was IPA:

D: Do you know where they stayed? Where in South Africa? Was it in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town?

W: Certainly in Pretoria. They may have also gone to other places.

D: Do you know for what purpose they came to South Africa? Was it for pleasure or leisure or training or...?

W: No, I think it was, again I believe that somewhere in my documentation I have a, or I may have a...I can remember there was a telex thing about it. From what I understood at the time there was a group that came and... It was on a sort of liaison... No, but wait a minute, I mean... The group I'm talking about that were in the telex I'm talking about were Swiss, not Scandinavian. No, they were Swiss because I laughed about it. I said "these are...you know...I mean...I've been chased out of Switzerland and now these Swiss policemen are coming to visit us". But really, if I've met any Scandinavian

police officers, it's been on an absolutely chance informal thing: maybe at an IPA drinks party or something, but I have no recollection of any...of any...

D: No kind of co-operation or something?

W: No.

D: Professionally, I mean.

W: Absolutely not.

D: You mentioned also that 1985 I think, you carried out or some operations abroad that you were going to the Truth Commission with. Is that correctly understood?

W: '85?

D: Yes, I think you said it.

W: No, I said "through the whole...from '80 to '85."

D: Okay.

W: '85...the only operation '85 was the Gaborone raid, which I'm going to the Truth Commission about.

D: Was any of those covert operations aimed at Sweden in any sense?

W: No.

D: Do you know of any operation aimed at Sweden?

W: During...during the British-based anti-ANC operation, I really don't have details,

[REDACTED]

. In

[REDACTED]

mer

D: As you may know, as you certainly know, the company Longreach has come to focus in accordance with the murder of Olof Palme. Allegations have been made of different sorts, so I want to put some more questions about the Longreach company. Do you remember when in fact it was established? Was it in April '87?

W: April/May.

D: Was that the first time?

W: '86.

D: '86, sorry. And that was the first time that you were confronted with the name Longreach? This company, how long did it last?

W:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Pom
HB 17835
H.F.L

D: Who actually bought the company? Who was the owner from the beginning? How did that develop?

Ö: Can we make a short break again because we're running out of tape? We have to change to a new one.

Ö: Okay, now it's a new tape. Please go on, Mr...

D: I asked you before we switched tapes: who bought the company, who owned it from the beginning and has there from time to another been different companionships?

W: [REDACTED]

Pom
HB 16609

D: Were there any other associates in the company or employees or...?

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

D: Was he engaged in the company from the beginning?

W: No. He was one of the people who were supposed, you know that I wanted to use as a consultant. I don't think...I don't think he was a shareholder. He may have been. I don't, I'm not sure.

D: And when did he leave for Mozambique? For how long did he stay with you in this project?

W:



D: Were there any other consultants or associates in the company during, let us say, '86?

W:

Pom



D: Such as...?

2 Pom

W:



D: In what way?

W:



[REDACTED]

D: Was that the last you had to do with him?

W: No, then...

D: When was it? Which year?

W: '87 I think. Early. Because then he sold information to a journalist to embarrass me during the election campaign and linked me with...

[REDACTED]

And especially in the election his job was to drive me around, look after me, make sure everything was okay, because it was felt that at that time the chances of an ANC attempt on my life were not totally negligible.

[REDACTED]

Paxu
10mcc
48017830

[REDACTED]

U: The Business Day.

W: Business Day. I saw a little report: the reserve bank issued a warning that Mr so-and-so [REDACTED] and this bank are not registered as deposit-taking institutions. [REDACTED] is now running a bank. So anyway then I found out that yes, [REDACTED]

Form
HBE 17832
M.F.L

[REDACTED]. And I just said to him...I can't remember his...I'll remember his name but he was the financial head of the National Party in Transvaal and he was on the President's Council and he said: "Do you know this guy?" And I said to him: "I do know him. [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED] And the guy said to me afterwards: "Thank you for your advice." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Then a couple of years...but then much later he contacted me, and but then I'd heard also from some friends in the intelligence community, people said: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] " So I said: "Well, this...this interests me, you know." And so I returned his call, [REDACTED]

Finally I return and the reason I went to see him was because the call came...when I called the number they said: "Hello, Econometrics." Now Econometrics is a very reputable South African company. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Peru

And he had...they had all these documents and he was involved with somebody called [REDACTED]. And I said: "fine, now you know what's all this?"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Even today a plain paper fax is expensive. In those days, plain paper fax was a very unusual thing and it cost a lot of money and I said, but...and he was talking about...the whole thing started because [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2 Peru

D: Such as...?

W: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

D: I want to return to Longreach then. [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

D: Are you still companions?

W: Yes. I haven't spoken to him about this matter, but one of my friends has spoken to him, and apparently he is, you know he is pulling out any information he can find about that time, because all my friends are trying to help me to get, you know the...you know I've got to shoot...my belief is we must put all the facts on the table and I'll put my facts on the table. Then we'll see whose facts stand up.

D: Then Longreach, as you have put it, started then on your behalf in April '87...'86.

W: '86.

D: Can you tell us...do you remember, and will you tell us, what you actually did, let us say from November '85 to April '86?

W: This is exactly what I'm trying to...got people researching for me. What I believe I did was: I was in Pretoria, then I spent time in Cape Town, definitely. December January. I was at a...I was on holiday there with friends and my... In that period I bought a hotel in Cape Town as well. Small, not a Southern Sun: a little thing. And I'm trying to get the documents at that time and what we did. But details, where I was is very difficult and that's...then I know in February, the biggest event then and in my life was my wife got pregnant in January and in February and what she's...the last conversation I had with her is I've asked her to go and get the doctor's records of the scan, you know what dates we went, because when she first was scanned for the pregnancy, because I think it was definitely in mid-February to late February. So I'm from my side doing everything I can to set down a chronology of where I was and what I was doing. And, you know but unfortunately I'm two weeks behind now. I don't know. I was here when Eugene de Kock made the statement, so all I've done is made some phone calls and got...I've employed an ex-colleague of mine and he's the top private investigator, top investigator in South Africa and I've got some friends go and get documents. I've asked people to see the [REDACTED], so that I, well, I didn't think from November, but I was working, you know January February. Did you want November or a day in November as well?

D: During that period, do you remember any particular project that you were engaged in?

W: You know, that was the end of my career in the police. I...the last big thing I remember was January...was July. [REDACTED]. I don't know the date. It was...

D: No particular remembers?

W: The other thing I have to find out, work out exactly is when I was on holiday as well. Because I took...I took several...at least two months leave at that time in order to use the leave that was owed me before I left.

D: You may have answered this before, but I'll question again for the record. Some people have implied that Longreach was a cover-up for some intelligence institution, such as the security police or military service. Is there any truth in that?

W: Yeah, but I think I told you: I mean Longreach was established to give me and a few other people cover.

D: And by whom? By the military intelligence or military service or...?

W: Yes, but by me but on behalf of military intelligence, chief of staff intelligence, directorate of covert collection...collection.

D: Did you have a controller?

W:

D: Can you spell that for us? Can you spell it out with a pen?

W:

*? Komer
1/25/80.5
D: Okay. Someone has told me that

W: Who?

D:

W: Yes, but that's...you see these people have mixed their time-frames. Have you met with

D: Not yet.

W: No. They've mixed their time-frames.

D: When was he in the picture then as far as you are concerned?

W:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was on the television in South Africa saying, standing at Daisy Farm and saying: "This is where these operations were planned." I mean you know Daisy Farm belong...Daisy belongs to the police. It doesn't belong to the military. These people think that Operation Longreach was a police operation. You know that's fine. Let them make all these statements and all their facts and I'll put my facts.

D: As you know, some people have pointed at you in connection with the murder of Olof Palme. Besides what you have told us already, can you see any reason for that?

W: You know, look I've had quite a few days to think about that. I never knew there was a reward until a Swedish journalist told me here in Luanda. I understand it's thirty million Rand. All right, well, you know... My belief is that that article, if you can find where the source of that first article, was it '89? that named me in a Swedish newspaper, then we start getting somewhere. Because I believe that the source of all the South African allegations is that article, because that article was never given prominence in South Africa, because people...you know the press ignored it. Except then Rapport a few months later wrote a stupid story about it. But people in the intelligence community obviously got that and I think it became an urban myth, you know: 'Craig Williamson's team killed Olof Palme! Did you know?' And I think there's certainly people like Eugene de Kock who've been told by this person and that person who seriously probably believe that I was involved. And there's people who probably think that if they beat the bush hard enough and I come running out and get caught in the net and I was the one who was involved, then there's serious money to be made by some people. But then some other [REDACTED] and the other compatriots that are coming out, I mean, there are people [REDACTED] has a serious grudge against me. De Kock has a grudge against me. I don't know why. I mean, I think because I went to the ANC in '94 and talked and de Kock got very angry with me. And...but he's now doing exactly what I did, it's just a few years later, but he's still angry with me because I did it then. He believes I'm... He's a bit of a paranoid individual. I mean I think he believes all sorts of funny things about me: that I'm working for strange organisations, that I worked against him, that I reported against him. He and I always politically didn't agree very much. And what he won't tell you is the hours I've spent with him trying to beg him not to do.. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

You know, he gets some wild ideas, Gene. I think he thinks that, you know, it's a funny thing: a lot of people if you read the press about me think I'm some wild right-winger. But if you know the truth about me, I'm actually, well, it's a bit...you know ten years with the ANC and with student politics, I mean I...you know I have some understanding of politics and of how things work and even in the 1989 election, the right-wing campaigned against me and it was said by the Conservative Party and others and even by an American: a well-known American, a right-winger who publishes a newsletter on South Africa, I'll remember his name in a moment, where he wrote: 'There are Soviet moles in the National Party'. And who do you think the Soviet mole was? Me! This is supposed to be the Soviet mole. Because they said "there are people in the National Party who want to hand over power to the ANC". And serious right-wingers believe that I was one of them, that I was one of the people working for this type of thing.

[REDACTED]

Ponce
HB 17666

Pom

[REDACTED]

And,

Pom
HBG 16609

you know, sir, I've been thinking about this but I seriously believe that the idea that we were potentially, possibly, could have been involved has come from that original article: that this idea has been in the diaspora and has got into people's brains.

D: Let me ask you a question that opens up for speculation. Let us assume that you yourself was not involved in the murder of Olof Palme, but that there is a South African link...

W: Yes, that's... If, a South African link, if South Africa was involved, you see this is... I, you know I know your job, I've been in similar jobs, I know the situation you're in and I know, we've all...I've sat and listened to somebody like me and I've said 'Can I believe him? Can't I believe him?' But I'm just telling you from a personal point of view, the reason I left the police was to get away from guns and bombs. And I said to my wife: "That's it, it's over, it's now politics." And we'd been married since 1974, and she fell pregnant in January 1986, that's...we decided 'that's it, new life, baby.' The last thing in the world I would do is get involved in this type of operation at that stage.

[REDACTED]

D: [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The police, I mean it's just not...I'm talking now of knowing the South African situation at that time. It's just not the type of operation that the police would be involved in. And I don't understand the motive anyway.

D: Have you...ever, in South Africa or elsewhere, heard people that you know speculate over the murder of Olof Palme, who could be responsible for it in some...?

W: You know, at the time that the article came out, I mean I was flabbergasted. And in fact I got very angry and I wrote a letter. Have you got a copy of the letter?

D: I think so, yes.

W:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] So at that time I was in fact amazed that there was no speculation. Because Swedish journalists found me. That's how I heard about this. And then since then the only people who've ever asked me about it, off and on, have been Swedish journalists. And I was quite amazed until that stupid story in Rapport, which I think had been cut by the edit...sub-editor or something, 'cos I mean it didn't make too much sense, that nobody actually

reacted. Nobody discussed it. Nobody even talked about it. And I'd never even thought about it again until, bang! I mean, Gene de Kock was saying things in his trial that I was the planner of the London bombing and all this and that. You know, that all went. I mean I...you know I was expecting him to say things like that, but then I was here when suddenly this came out, so, you know it's like a ten-year-old story that just suddenly jumped up at me again.

D: Do you say that this article in 1989 was the first time that you were aware of the possibility that there was a South African link?

W: Absolutely. Well, I mean yes, but I mean obviously they were saying the link was me.

D: Yes, but you haven't heard of any person...

W: I hadn't heard before that, no.

Ö:

[REDACTED]

W:

[REDACTED]

10 min
HB
HBD 17530

[REDACTED]

Ö: Well, we have to turn over the tape again.

Ö: Okay, we start again and the first name I would ask you [REDACTED]

10 min

W: Yes.

Ö: Tell us about this man.

W: [REDACTED]

Ö: Okay. Has he been involved in some sort of dirty tricks, as far as you know?

W: Not that I know of, [REDACTED]

Ö: [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. I don't know him very well. He did at one stage work for us. I'm not sure whether he was in RS. I think at one stage he was RS, I'm not sure. But anyway, he definitely was involved in the conservative student group that we were sponsoring at that time. And I think at some stage he then had to like complete his service or whatever and he worked in Pretoria. He actually worked as an analyst or on the desk or something. At a later stage he went off and he became involved in politics, because I think he was naturally quite conservative and became involved with Inkatha, the Inkatha Freedom Party. And all I know about him is what I read about him: he was involved in more or less their paramilitary operations and he is now a senator in the Parliament for IFP.

D: Have you, sorry, been involved in any operation that he has been involved in?

W: I was the boss of...I think there was a thing called 'the student moderate society' and I believe he was involved then, but then, you know I was by that time I mean I was the head of the whole section. There were at every university, five, ten people. I mean, there were operations running, and I believe he was involved in one of those operations, but he wasn't directly involved with me.

D: Do you know if he is acquainted to, for instance, Eugene de Kock?

W: Yes. I understand, look...there, you know, I don't know, I understand that because he was very much involved. The idea, at one stage just after 1990 in South Africa was that some people, like [REDACTED], but some others were saying that the only way that the IFP could get their true position that they should have in South Africa was to also have an armed capability in the same way that the ANC had and so on. So there was quite an attempt at that time to build up their armed capability and I believe that at that time [REDACTED] and de Kock had some connections.

Ö: Which time are you talking about?

W: Post-1990.

Ö: [REDACTED]

Pom
48616609
48017830

W: [REDACTED] He's the one who's busy coordinating the investigation. He's not carrying it, but he's coordinating to get all my records of where I was in those months. He runs a restaurant in northern Johannesburg. He assisted as probably up until 1981 - 82. During my years when I was overseas he was used to help in the operation. When I came back he just went into his family business. What else?

Ö: [REDACTED]

Pom

W: [REDACTED] is somebody who was...I didn't know him then but he also at the same school as me. He's a few years older than me. He was, I'm not sure who introduced me to him, but it could have been [REDACTED] because they're big friends. He owns a...he's a horticulturalist and he's very, he's very...he's conservative and I used him to run an organisation called 'Victims Against Terrorism', VAT, that went, for example, to demonstrate outside the ANC office in London. And it was a, what do you call it? stratcom: strategic communication, a psychological warfare operation, publicity.

Ö: And another thing:

D: Does he have any background as a policeman or a soldier?

W: I don't think so. I think he must have done his national service, but he's certainly nothing more than his national...normal national service.

D: No intelligence work?

W: No. Only, you know the VAT: Victims Against Terrorism.

Pom

Ö: Okay. [REDACTED]

W: [REDACTED]

D: Any comments upon him?

W: Never met him, don't know him and warned [REDACTED] what he would do.

Ö: Okay, then I don't have any more questions. Do you want to say anything more for yourself?

W: All I want to say is that I'm sure the Palme family and the Swedish government are very keen to get to the bottom of this murder. And I can promise you, very close on your heels, I'm third as keen.

Ö: And those documents you will take forward, you have help back in, can you provide us with...?

W: I am prepared, when I get back to South Africa, I will liaise with the police or the intelligence people. The man I have employed to do the research is an ex-member of National Intelligence, and I am prepared that an official South African and even a Swedish official can work with him and I will point them where to go, what to do, my bank accounts, everything. And I...because even my lawyer will have a heart attack when he knows I've spoken to you, but when...this isn't a matter of me trying to avoid being convicted. this is a matter of me wanting to clear my name and there is not...I was not involved, therefore there is nothing that can be there that shows I was involved, there can only be stuff that shows I was not involved and I will cooperate 110%.

Ö: Okay. Then we will end this interrogation at 48...twelve minutes to three o'clock.

END OF INTERROGATION

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Hans A. ...' with a stylized flourish at the end.