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We believe Terry Waite has become a victim of his own initiatives. He evidently believed his peacefUL mission and role as a mediator would protect him, but these Hizballah leaders were undeterred by Islamic hospitality. Those who decided to detain him probably believe they can pressure the British Government to press their demands, particularly Hizballah's unwavering goal of the release of 17 Dawa Party terrorists held in Kuwait, who were convicted in the bombings of the US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti installations in 1983.

(b)(3) Other Hostages It is unlikely that all the recent hostage takings are related to the arrest of Muhammad Hammadi. Two Saudis abducted in mid-January, for instance, probably were seized as part of Iran's attempt to dissuade the Saudis from attending the Islamic Conference summit in Kuwait. A French journalist, Roger Auque, also was seized in January as he covered Terry Waite's mission, but no claims have been made yet on his behalf. At least two and possibly four blond English- or German-speaking males were kidnaped while they were shopping in West Beirut in late January. Various press accounts describe them as Armenians, East Europeans, or Scandinavians. They probably were mistaken for German or American nationals, but they have not been released, and no organization has taken credit for their abductions.[ (b)(3)

Outlook In our judgment, prospects for the early release of these hostages—including Terry Waite—are not good. We are almost certain that the captors represent Shia extremist elements. Some of the recent operations could have been financially motivated, done by freelance terrorists who honed to ransom Westerners to the highest bidders.

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Regardless of who initially seized them, we believe decisions on the fate of the hostages will be made by Hizballah's leaders, probably with some reference to Iran. Tehran apparently was not involved in the recent abductions, but probably has been in contact with Hizballah leaders and could play an intermediary role. Despite Iran's considerable support to Hizballah and shared ideological objectives, however, Tehran does not control the hostage holders.

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Syrian or Lebanese pressure to release them is unlikely to sway Hizballah. Damascus currently has only marginal influence with Hizballah, and President Assad has been unwilling to confront Hizballah directly. In our view, the growth of the organization and the number of hostages it is hiding in crowded West Beirut have outstripped Assad's ability to intervene forcibly. Walid Junblatt's Druze militia was responsible for Waite's safety, and Junblatt probably feels his offer to trade places with Waite and to fight Hizballah will help salvage his credibility. Nevertheless, Druze threats are even less likely to force Hizballah to release the Anglican envoy

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