wpu.nu

Sida:Pol-1986-03-28 cia-CIA-Memorandum-Soviet-Disinformation.pdf/148

Från wpu.nu

Den här sidan har inte korrekturlästs


WAT

FB

Figure 3. AVC weapons taken from safehouse in Quito.

(b)(3)

for the security forces from the United States and other governments and encouraged them to focus on good police practices. Most important, FebresCordero fully supports his counterterrorist forces and has shown the political will to back them against attacks from opposition political parties. His aggressive approach has occasionally resulted in abuses, but it has also improved the confidence and overall effectiveness of the security.serviceSb)(3)

group will divide over the issue of continued militancy versus a more clearly defined political agenda. Some elements of the AVC then might attempt to integrate into one or more of the established radical leftist parties, leaving the remaining AVC militants. perl(b)(3). more violent than before.

Despite the group's overall decline, some members are still active and, according to press accounts, staged brief takeovers of a 'radio station in December. Incidents of this kind. signal that the group can still mount limited operations, and may be able to stage a limited comeback if the government fails to press its hard-won gains.

(b)(3)

Outlook We believe the AVC will find it difficult to recover from its current state of disarray. The government has demonstrated the political will to press its advantage and to prevent the group from surfacing as a major threat in the near future. The killings of several key: AVC leaders over the past year have not only demoralized the group but have also provoked a leadership crisis. These blows have destroyed the AVC as a national organization, and reduced it to groups of isolated cells working haphazardly. In fact, some members of the group have called for a national dialogue with the government to be mediated by the church. We believe that, like its forerunners, the

14

Secret

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C05922883